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Bank Competition: Measurement, Decision-Making and Risk Profiles 
This paper investigates how competition impacts the future operating decisions and risk profile 
of banks. We construct a comprehensive, time-varying, bank-specific measure of a bank’s 
competitive environment (BCE) using textual analysis of banks’ 10-K filings. Using U.S. branch 
banking deregulation to capture exogenous changes in threats of entry, we provide evidence that 
BCE is a timely measure of real competitive pressures by showing that it significantly increases 
following decreases in barriers to entry. Measuring competition with BCE, we find that higher 
competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition 
and a shift towards non-interest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated 
with higher stand-alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank’s downside equity 
risk to system-wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of 
the banking sector. We then show that these results using BCE are largely robust to replacing 
BCE with branch bank deregulation. Finally, we show that our BCE results hold in a post-
deregulation analysis restricted to time periods following the final deregulation event in each 
state. These results combine to suggest that competition increases the risk profile of banks and 
that BCE can be of value to researchers and analysts for measuring competitive pressure at any 
point in time, regardless of the existence of a regulatory event.  
1 
1. Introduction
The centrality of banks in the financial system and the potential for bank failures to 
impose negative externalities on the economy raise concerns about the relationship between bank 
competition and both excessive risk-taking by individual banks and buildups of banking system 
vulnerabilities due to correlations in risk taking behavior across banks. This issue is not only 
important to bank regulators and policy makers, but also to financial analysts, credit rating 
agencies and investors who seek to forecast banks’ future prospects. Economic theory provides 
competing hypotheses on whether bank competition enhances or undermines financial stability. 
The competition-fragility hypothesis posits that downward pressure on bank profits from intense 
competition creates incentives for banks to take excessive risks (e.g., Keeley [1990], Allen and 
Gale [2000, chapter 8]). In contrast, the competition-stability hypothesis posits that the interest 
rates banks charge borrowers increase with banks’ market power, where higher rates induce 
borrowing firms to take on greater risk which increase the risk of banks’ portfolios. This leads to 
the hypothesis that banks become less risky as competition increases (Boyd and De Nicolo 
[2005]). While prior empirical literature explores these hypotheses, the evidence is inconclusive 
on whether or not competition leads to greater bank risk.1      
In this paper, we address three important open questions in the banking literature: How 
should bank competition be measured? What specific channels does bank competition operate 
through to increase or decrease risk?  Does bank competition increase or decrease individual 
bank and banking system risk? We make several contributions to the existing literature.  
First, we construct a comprehensive, time-varying, bank-specific measure of a bank’s 
competitive environment (BCE) using textual analysis of banks’ 10-K filings. We validate this 
1 See reviews by Beck (2008), Carletti (2008), Degryse and Ongena (2008), and the discussion in Berger et al. 
(2004). 
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measure using U.S. branch banking deregulation to capture exogenous changes in the threat of 
entry, providing evidence consistent with BCE capturing changes in the real competitive 
environment of specific banks in a more timely fashion than classical competition measures. 
Second, we investigate how competition influences three key decision-making channels that 
prior literature links to increased bank risk. We find that higher competition is associated with 
lower underwriting standards, less timely accounting recognition of expected loan losses, and a 
greater reliance on non-interest sources of income.2 Finally, we show that risk at the individual 
bank level and a bank’s contribution to system-wide risk are increasing in competition. 
Specifically, we find that competition is associated with significantly higher risk of individual 
banks suffering severe drops in their equity and asset values. At the system level, we find that 
higher competition is associated with significantly higher co-dependence between downside risk 
of individual banks and downside risk of the entire banking sector.    
Why is there potential value in creating a text-based measure of competition from banks’ 
10-K filings? As noted by Beck [2008] there is no agreement in the banking literature about how 
to measure competition as different measures can lead to conflicting results. Two important 
classes of bank competition measures are (1) measures of industry structure which presume that 
market structure determines bank conduct, and (2) market power measures that infer competitive 
conduct without regard to market structure (e.g., Degryse and Ongena [2008], Beck [2008]), 
Berger et al. [2004]. One limitation of industry structure measures (e.g., Herfindahl Hirschman 
indices) is that they require industry membership to be explicitly defined, which makes it 
difficult to capture competition deriving from potential entrants and non-banks. These measures 
                                                          
2 We also perform a channel attenuation analysis (Baron and Kenny, 1986) and provide evidence that a significant 
portion (~20%) of the association between competition and measures of systemic risk work through both the 
accounting channel (i.e., timely loss recognition) and the operating channel (i.e., revenue mix). 
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also rely on the restrictive assumption that all industry members are continuously subject to 
identical levels of competition.3  In contrast, measures of market power estimate competition by 
examining relationships between factor input prices and revenues. An important example is the 
Lerner index, a bank-specific measure designed to estimate the gap between marginal costs and 
revenues.4 Its construction requires researchers to estimate parameters of the marginal cost 
function using historical accounting data in a pooled industry regression. Reliance on historical 
accounting data suggests that the Lerner index may be sluggish in capturing changes in the 
competitive environment, and the pooled industry estimation necessarily assumes that all banks 
in the researcher-defined industry have identical marginal cost functions.  
The textual analysis approach we take to extract a bank-specific measure of competition 
from 10-K filings builds directly on Li et al. [2013]. The premise of this measure, BCE, is that it 
captures managers’ current perceptions of the competitive pressures facing a bank from any and 
all sources, including potential entrants and non-bank competitors, and can capture evolving 
competitive pressures that are not yet fully reflected in a bank’s past performance. This measure 
allows for competitive pressure to vary both across banks in a given year, and across years for 
any given bank due, for example, to differences in geographic footprints (Dick [2006]), business 
models (Altunbas et al. [2011]) or product line mixes (Bolt and Humphrey [2012]).5 Further, this 
measure requires no equilibrium assumptions, no requirements that market boundaries be 
defined, and no restrictive assumptions about bank cost functions.  
                                                          
3 Further, it is not clear whether industry structure determines bank behavior or is itself the result of bank 
performance (e.g., Claessens and Laeven [2004], Cetorelli [1999], Berger et al. [2004  
4 While we focus on the Lerner index, another measure of market power is the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (e.g., 
Claessens and Laeven [2004]; Bikker et al. [2012]). In contrast to the Lerner index, the H-statistic is difficult to 
estimate at the individual bank level and is typically estimated at the industry level.  
5 This measure need not be symmetric across banks.  For example, consider a bank holding company with branches 
in many geographically dispersed markets and a small bank operating in one local market. While the small bank 
may report facing intense competition, its single market is a small part of the large bank’s geographic scope and may 
have little influence on perceptions of competition from the overall bank holding company’s perspective.   
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Li et al. [2013] make a strong case for the validity of this text-based measure for non-
financial firms by showing: 1) that it correlates to some extent with other common competition 
measures, and 2) that firm profitability more severely mean reverts for firms with higher values 
of the measure. While we obtain similar results in the banking industry, we are able to 
significantly extend the validation process by exploiting several salient opportunities unique to 
banking. First and foremost is our ability to exploit branch bank deregulation in the United States 
to capture exogenous changes in the threat of entry into a state’s banking market.6 We show that 
BCE significantly increases following reductions in barriers to out-of-state branching. This result 
holds after controlling for both the Lerner and Herfindahl indices. We also find that while the 
Lerner index is correlated with our BCE measure it does not respond to changes in entry threats, 
suggesting that our measure reflects changes in the competitive environment in a more timely 
fashion than the Lerner index.7 
As additional validation, we exploit recurring surveys conducted by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve in which banks regularly report that 
changes in competition are the most prevalent reason for easing underwriting standards.8 We 
examine associations between BCE and characteristics of subsequent syndicated loan deals for 
which the bank serves as lead arranger. We find that as competition increases, credit quality of 
borrowers at loan origination decreases, loan interest spreads become less sensitive to borrowers’ 
                                                          
6 Specifically, we identify changes in threat of entry based on interstate variation in the timing and extent of 
adoption by states of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) using a deregulation index 
developed by Rice and Strahan [2010]. See section 2 for additional details.  
7 We do not examine the response of bank concentration to deregulation as Dick [2006] already shows that IBBEA 
had little impact on concentration at the metropolitan statistical area level, while increasing at the regional level.  
8 For example, the 2012 Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) indicates that competition is the most prevalent reason that lenders ease their underwriting 
standards (Refer to Figures 3 and 4 of the survey at: http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/survey-credit-underwriting-practices-report/pub-survey-cred-under-2012.pdf). 
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credit quality, and the number of covenants decreases. These findings are consistent with the 
regulatory surveys and provide additional evidence that BCE captures real competitive pressure. 
Moving beyond measure validation, we examine two key decision-making channels 
through which competition can influence bank stability. First, we examine the association 
between BCE and loan loss provisioning. Competitive pressure on profits can create incentives 
for managers to prop up reported earnings by delaying recognition of expected loan losses. Prior 
research suggests that delaying expected loss recognition can have negative implications for 
credit supply (Beatty and Liao [2011]), risk shifting (Bushman and Williams [2012]), and the 
vulnerability of banks and the banking system to downside risk (Bushman and Williams [2014]). 
Consistent with banks managing earnings upward in response to competitive pressure, we find 
that the extent to which a bank delays recognition of expected loan losses is increasing in BCE. 
Second, we examine the association between BCE and a bank’s decisions to shift its 
revenue mix towards non-interest sources (e.g., investment banking, proprietary trading, 
insurance underwriting, etc.). A growing literature provides evidence that expanding into such 
non-traditional banking activities increases the riskiness of individual banks and decreases the 
stability of the banking system.9 We extend this literature by showing that the proportion of 
revenues a bank derives from non-interest sources is significantly increasing in BCE.  
Given our findings that banks relax lending standards, delay recognition of expected loan 
losses and shift revenue mix in response to higher competition, prior research would predict an 
increase in a bank’s risk profile (e.g., Bushman and Williams, 2014; Brunnermeir et al., 2012). 
However, it is possible that banks counteract increases in risk through these channels by 
engaging in offsetting risk mitigation activities. A bank has multiple levers available to mitigate 
                                                          
9 We discuss this literature in section 3.2 of the paper.  
6 
 
risk, but a primary lever is a bank’s capital buffer. Banking theory does not provide clear 
guidance on this issue and empirical studies provide conflicting results concerning the relation 
between competition and bank capital (see section 3.3). We examine the association between 
competition and Tier 1 capital finding that bank capital decreases as competition increases. 
Building on our previous analyses of relations between competition and bank decisions 
we next examine the ultimate effect of these decisions on direct measures of individual bank risk 
and systemic risk. We first investigate whether increased competition impacts future loan 
performance. Our previous result that higher competition is associated with reduced lending 
standards raises the possibility that future loan performance is negatively associated with 
competition. Consistent with this, we find that the loan growth of banks facing higher 
competition is associated with higher future loan charge-offs relative to banks facing lower 
competition.  
Next, we find that an individual bank’s risk of suffering a severe drop in equity and asset 
values is increasing in BCE. At the banking system level, we focus on codependence in 
downside risk of changes in both banks’ equity and asset values using codependence measures 
developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011] and Acharya et al. [2010].10 We find evidence 
suggesting that banks reporting higher values of BCE contribute more to the tail risk of the 
financial system and have increased exposure to downside equity risk during times of system-
wide distress. While these results combine to suggest that competition has overall negative 
implications for individual bank risk and banking system stability, we acknowledge that we 
                                                          
10 Competition can increase system-wide fragility by influencing many banks to herd in their decision-making, 
simultaneously choosing to increase risk by, for example, delaying expected loss recognition, pursuing similar 
sources of non-interest revenue and easing credit standards. 
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cannot speak to the overall welfare effects of competition as there are potentially significant 
positive benefits of competition that we do not address in this paper.  
Finally, we break our analyses into two parts, a deregulation and post-deregulation 
analysis. For the deregulation analyses, we truncate the sample to end after the final deregulation 
event in the sample and run our analyses using the branch bank deregulation index to measure 
competition. The post-deregulation analyses measure competition with BCE and only include 
observations subsequent to the last deregulation event in a state. We find that our main results 
largely hold in both the deregulation and post-deregulation analyses.11 The fact that we largely 
replicate our main BCE results using the deregulation index supports our claim that our BCE 
results reflect an actual linkage between competition and future decisions and risk. The fact that 
the post-deregulation analyses using BCE replicate the results from both our overall BCE and 
deregulation analyses suggests that BCE can be of value to researchers, investors, and analysts 
seeking to measure competitive pressure at any point in time, regardless of a regulatory event.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the construction of 
our text-based measure of competition and discusses our validation tests of the measure. Section 
3 presents our analyses of the relations between competition and banks’ accounting decisions 
and revenue mix choices, and section 4 presents our analyses of connections between 
competition and bank stability. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Data limitations preclude us from running deregulation analysis for the loan contracting variables as Dealscan is 
too thinly populated during the years when many of the deregulation events occurred. 
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2.  A Text-based Measure of a Bank’s Competitive Environment (BCE) 
In section 2.1 we detail the construction and interpretation of BCE. We then perform two 
substantive validation exercises. Section 2.2 examines how BCE responds to branch banking 
deregulation, while section 2.3 examines relations between BCE and underwriting standards. 
2.1 Construction and Interpretation of BCE  
2.1.1 Construction of BCE 
A growing literature in accounting and finance provides evidence that valuable 
information can be extracted from published financial reports by applying textual analysis 
techniques to the text of these reports (e.g., Ball et al. [2013], Brown and Tucker [2011], and Li 
[2010, a and b]). To construct BCE from a bank’s discussion of its competitive situation in its 
10-K filing, we follow the two-step algorithm developed by Li et al. [2013] in their analysis of 
competition in non-banking industries.12 First, we count the number of occurrences of the words 
“competition, competitor, competitive, compete, competing,” including those words with an “s” 
appended.  Second, we remove all cases where the competition words included in BCE are 
preceded by “not”, “less”, “few”, or “limited” by three or fewer words. This second step is 
included to increase power and reduce attenuation bias in parameter estimates resulting from 
false-positives.  
The second step of the BCE algorithm most certainly does not remove every false-
positive. While we could construct additional versions of the BCE measure by altering the Li et 
al. [2013] algorithm, there is no obvious way to compare alternative measures as to their 
“accuracy” in capturing the competition construct. We envision our contributions to the textual 
analysis literature as extending Li et al. [2013] by exploiting branch banking deregulation and 
                                                          
12 We thank Feng Li for helping us implement the textual analysis of banks’ 10-Ks. 
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other unique features of the banking setting to perform new, discriminating validation tests of 
BCE. Further, as we show below, the current construction is shown to have considerable power 
for predicting bank behavior and risk. We could also employ more sophisticated computational 
linguistic tools designed to capture meaning. However, as noted by Li et al. [2013], capturing the 
notion of competition in a more structured way would require much more detailed assumptions 
about the exact nature of competition, and the context and linguistic structure of the references to 
competition. On this point, Loughran and McDonald [2014] state that they “have not found more 
sophisticated techniques to add value”, and thus continue to tabulate words rather than use these 
more sophisticated techniques.13 
Given the count nature of our metric, we control for the length of the 10-K by scaling by 
the total number of words in each bank’s 10-K, resulting in the following bank-year measure of a 
bank’s competitive environment (BCE): 
#
#
CompWordsBCE
TotalWords
 , 
where #CompWords is the number of occurrences of competition words found in the bank’s 10-
K and #TotalWords is the total number of words in the bank’s 10-K.  BCE is computed on an 
annual basis for each bank. Accordingly, we use quarterly data and apply our annual BCE 
measure to the four subsequent quarters for our primary analyses. Descriptive statistics for BCE 
                                                          
13 Loughran and McDonald (2014) also highlight two conditions that researchers can use to improve the construct 
validity of their textual analysis measures. Specifically, they indicate that: 1) researchers should avoid wordlists and 
algorithms derived in the context of other disciplines and 2) use textual analysis to test hypotheses based on 
straightforward characteristics of the data that “require the least amount of econometric exorcism to produce the 
results”. BCE meets both of these conditions as it is: 1) specifically designed for the purpose of performing 
accounting research (Li et al., 2013), and 2) designed to capture a straightforward characteristic (competition) that is 
required to be disclosed as part of each bank’s 10-K filing. 
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and the other measures in our paper are provided in Table 1. BCE has a mean (median) value of 
0.35 (0.31) and exhibits significant variation with standard deviation of 0.26. 14  
2.1.2 What is BCE Designed to Capture?  
Our use of 10-K reports to construct BCE is designed to capture perceptions of 
competition from the perspective of top management of the overall holding company or banking 
organization. The banking businesses of the publicly traded banks in our sample span a range of 
different business models and numerous geographic locations including within the state where 
they are headquartered, across state lines and even internationally for the larger banks. Further, 
competition is a multi-dimensional construct consistent, for example, with Michael Porter’s 
framework in which competition consists of five forces, with threat of entry representing one of 
the five (Porter [2008]). We posit that BCE encapsulates in a single metric bank managers’ 
overall perceptions of the intensity of competitive pressures deriving from any and all sources. 
To mitigate concerns that banks may use boilerplate language in the 10-K we incorporate bank 
and time fixed effects in all of our regression analysis. Including bank fixed effects is also 
consistent with a financial statement analysis perspective that seeks to exploit within firm 
variation fundamental to predict future decisions of individual banks. 
It is also important to consider the relationship between competition and bank 
profitability.  The competition construct, at a fundamental level, encompasses the idea that more 
intense behavior from new and existing rivals diminishes a firm’s ability to earn profits. As a 
result, it is quite possible that a bank currently perceiving an increase in competitive pressure is 
also currently experiencing downward pressure on profits. To the extent that this is the case, 
                                                          
14 In the online appendix, Table A1 we provide additional descriptive analyses of the impact that each competition 
word has on the BCE measure. This discussion is intended to: 1) highlight how the BCE measure was created to 
minimize the imprecision associated with our use of textual analysis; and 2) be transparent about the construction of 
the BCE variable. 
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BCE and poor performance could be manifestations of the same underlying shift in competitive 
forces. If current performance captures all information about a shift in competition, then BCE at 
time t would likely not load in our regressions if we also include ROA at time t. Another 
possibility is that BCE does not reflect competition but is rather an attempt by bank managers to 
strategically use their reporting discretion to blame a bank’s poor performance on competition. 
As a result, where appropriate, we control for ROA at time t (contemporaneous with our BCE 
measure). This allows us to determine if BCE has incremental information about future decision 
making and risk over and above current performance, and to mitigate concerns about strategic 
reporting in the 10-K. In this sense we are able to distinguish BCE from current profitability. 
Using a simple word count algorithm to capture a complex economic construct such as 
competition confronts us with the challenge of convincing the reader that the measure actually 
reflects the intended construct. Li et al. (2013) makes a strong case for the validity of this 
measure in a non-bank setting by showing that it correlates with other common competition 
measures, and via their main result that firm profitability more severely mean reverts for firms 
with higher values of the text-based measure. While we obtain similar results when we perform 
these same validation exercises in the banking setting, in sections 2.2 and 2.3 we significantly 
extend the validation process by exploiting several salient opportunities unique to banking.15 
2.2. Validating BCE using branch banking deregulation 
In an effort to validate BCE as a timely measure of real competitive pressures we 
examine whether it significantly increases following exogenous increases in one important 
dimension of bank competition, the threat of entry. We identify changes in the threat of entry 
based on interstate variation in both the timing and extent of adoption by state legislatures of the 
                                                          
15 In the online appendix, we show that competition increases the mean reversion intensity of bank profitability 
(Table A3).   
12 
 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA). Passed in 1994, the most crucial 
provisions of the IBBEA pertained to interstate branch banking. These provisions were designed 
to allow banks and bank holding companies to acquire out-of-state banks and convert them into 
branches of the acquiring bank, or to open de novo branches across state borders.  
However, while IBBEA eliminated federal restrictions on interstate branching, states 
were permitted to restrict interstate branching. Specifically, states were free to impose up to four 
restrictions on interstate branching: requiring a minimum age of three years or more on target 
institutions, setting a statewide deposit concentration limit of 30%, forbidding de novo interstate 
branching, and prohibiting the acquisition of single branches by out-of-state banks. Prior 
research shows that these restrictions are significantly associated with the threat of entry by out-
of-state banks (e.g., Johnson and Rice [2008]}.  
We use the annual state-level index of these four restrictions on interstate branching from 
1994 to 2005 created by Rice and Strahan (2010). The index, denoted RegIndex, is zero for states 
without entry restrictions (greatest threat of entry) and increases by one for each of the four 
restrictions up to a maximum of four (the least threat of entry). We gather quarterly data 
primarily from Y9-C filings, Compustat, Dealscan and CRSP. Our sample is limited to all bank-
quarter observations of commercial banks and bank holding companies (two digit SIC 60-62) 
that have all the necessary data components. We eliminate observations if the bank was involved 
in an acquisition during that particular quarter. The time period of our data spans 1996-2010.  
Table 2, panel A reports results from OLS regressions of BCE on RegIndex and control 
variables, all measured contemporaneously. Recall that RegIndex is the number of restrictions on 
interstate branching, where fewer restrictions imply greater competition. We include two control 
variables that reflect a state’s economic performance, the unemployment rate and the leading 
13 
 
index for the state.16  We also include bank and year fixed effects. From panel A, column one, 
we see that BCE responds to changes in the threat of entry as captured by changes in the 
restriction index. The coefficient on RegIndex is -0.007, and is significantly different from zero 
(p-value < 0.05). This result shows that a reduction in RegIndex (an increase in threat of entry) is 
associated with an increase in a bank’s BCE. That is, the extent to which banks discuss their 
competitive environment in 10-K filings significantly increases following a reduction in barriers 
to out-of-state branching.  
In column two of table 2, panel A (entitled BCE and Geographic Footprint), we repeat 
the prior analysis after taking into account that banks may have operations across a number of 
states. Because BCE is extracted from the 10-K report, it reflects a comprehensive view of 
competition across all of the geographic regions in which the bank operates. We identify the 
states where a bank has deposits using the Summary of Deposits report from the FDIC, and 
weight RegIndex and other state-level variables by the percentage of the bank's deposits in those 
states in a given year. As shown in column 2, the results for this analysis are nearly identical to 
those reported in column 1. 
While the previous result shows that BCE captures changes in the competitive 
environment, it does not establish whether BCE has incremental value as a measure of 
competition relative to traditional competition measures. To address this issue, we repeat the 
prior analysis after replacing BCE with a bank’s Lerner index whose estimation is described in 
Appendix A. In panel A of table 2, column 3 (entitled LI) we see that the Lerner index does not 
                                                          
16 The source of these variables is the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank’s web site. The leading index for each 
state predicts the six-month growth rate of the state’s coincident index, where the coincident index combines four 
state-level indicators to summarize current economic conditions in a single statistic. The four state-level indicators 
are nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and 
salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index.  
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respond to changes in RegIndex. This result does not speak to the validity of the Lerner index as 
a measure of competition, but does provide evidence that Lerner is sluggish in capturing changes 
in the competitive environment relative to the more timely BCE measure.17  
To further address this issue, we perform a two-stage regression analysis to investigate 
whether BCE reflects information incremental to that captured by Lerner and state-level 
Herfindahl Hirschman indices (HH).18 In the first-stage, we estimate an OLS regression of BCE 
on the Lerner and HH indices.  As documented in column 1 of panel B, the coefficient on Lerner 
is -0.74 (p-value < 0.01), while the coefficient on HH is 0.03, which is not significantly different 
from zero. The negative coefficient on Lerner is intuitive as larger values of Lerner imply less 
competition. This result shows that BCE and Lerner reflect some common information about a 
bank’s competitive environment. Next, we take the BCE residual from the first stage and 
estimate an OLS regression of this residual against RegIndex. In column 2 of panel B, we see 
that the coefficient of -0.006 on RegIndex is significantly different from zero (p-value < 0.05). 
That is, BCE contains information about a bank’s competitive environment that is independent of 
any information reflected in Lerner and HH.    
2.3 Validating BCE Using Changes in Banks’ Credit Standards 
As a second validation analysis, we exploit recurring surveys conducted by the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve. These surveys inquire about the extent 
to which banks have recently eased or tightened credit standards, and their reasons for doing so. 
Responses indicate that changes in competition are the most prevalent reason for easing their 
                                                          
17 In the online appendix, we perform additional analyses on the timeliness of BCE relative to the Lerner index. We 
document that while the Lerner index does not respond immediately to current changes in competition, it does 
capture current changes in competition with a lag, where a change in regulation at time t is reflected in the Lerner 
index in time t+2 (Table A2).  
18 Note that our inclusion of time fixed effects controls out country-level measures of competition such as country-
level Herfindahl indices and H-statistics.  .   
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underwriting standards.19 Accordingly, we can provide additional validation that BCE captures 
real competitive pressures by examining whether higher values of BCE are associated with more 
relaxed underwriting standards. We examine the following three underwriting standards: (1) the 
quality of borrowers as measured by their risk of default, (2) loan pricing sensitivity to the 
borrowers’ level of risk, and (3) covenant restrictions.20  In addition to validating our competition 
measure, this analysis provides information about an important channel that influences bank 
stability. In fact, Section 2080.1 of the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Bank Examination 
Manual suggests a causal relationship between higher bank competition, lower underwriting 
standards, and increased bank risk. Specifically, it states: “[s]ince lenders are subject to 
pressures related to productivity and competition, they may be tempted to relax prudent credit 
underwriting standards to remain competitive in the marketplace, thus increasing the potential 
for risk.”  
 We examine characteristics of syndicated loan deals for which the bank serves as lead 
arranger. This information is available in the Dealscan database. We hand match Dealscan data 
to lender and borrower data in Compustat and in YC-9 reports (Chava & Roberts [2008] and 
Murfin [2012]). Because many of our variables are measured at the loan package level, we run 
our analyses at that level. When measuring interest spread, we take the average spread over all 
facilities within a given package.21  
                                                          
19 For example, the summary included in the July 2012 survey indicates that “[a]lmost all domestic banks that 
reported having eased standards or terms on C&I loans continued to cite more aggressive competition from other 
banks and nonbank lenders as a reason.”  The individual responses in support of this statement are tabulated as part 
of Question 3, Part B of the survey (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/201208/default.htm.)  
Also, as noted in footnote 5, the survey conducted by the OCC provides similar support for this relationship. 
20 We review every annual Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices conducted by the OCC during our sample period 
and find that loan pricing (e.g., the spread) is the mechanism most frequently relaxed when more lenders report 
having eased underwriting standards than tightening them.  Covenants are indicated as the second most frequently 
relaxed mechanism during these periods.   
21 In untabulated results we also use the maximum spread in the package instead of the mean and results are robust. 
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 In addition to a set of appropriate control variables, all empirical specifications in this 
section and throughout the remainder of our paper include both bank and time fixed effects 
(borrower fixed effects are also included in the syndicated loan analyses). The inclusion of bank 
fixed effects provides a within bank design, while time fixed effects provide important controls 
for time specific outcomes that impact all banks (e.g., time variation in bank sector Herfindahl 
Hirschman indices and H-Statistics).  
2.3.1 BCE and Borrower Risk 
 We first examine whether banks make loans to riskier borrowers in response to increased 
competition. We compute each borrower’s Z-Score using Altman’s original weighting factors 
(Altman [1977]), and the borrower’s estimated default frequency (EDF) as described by Bharath 
& Shumway [2008].  We also use an indicator variable, ExtremeZ, which is set equal to 1 if the 
borrower’s Z-Score indicates that the firm is in distress at the time of loan origination.22 We 
estimate the following pooled regressions, clustering standard errors by both time and bank to 
correct for possible time-series and cross-sectional correlation. 
BorrowerRiskt  0  1BCEt  2Tier 1t  3LenderSizet  4BorrowerSizet 
5Revolvert  6 Amountt  7 Maturityt  8Spreadt  9 #Covenantst 
BankEffects BorrowerEffects TimeEffects   t ,
         (1) 
where BorrowerRisk is defined as Z-Score, EDF or ExtremeZ.  Tier 1 is included to control for 
differences in capital adequacy and is defined as the lead bank’s Tier 1 capital prior to the date of 
the loan.  Lender (Borrower) Size is the natural logarithm of total assets of the lender (borrower) 
prior to the date of the loan.  Revolver is an indicator variable if the loan includes a revolver.  
Amount is the natural log of the package amount.  Maturity is the number of months to maturity.  
                                                          
22 Z-scores lower than 1.81 are considered to be in a “distress” zone whereas Z-Scores greater than 2.99 are deemed 
to be “safe” and Z-scores in between 1.81 and 2.99 are said to be in a “grey” zone. 
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Spread is measured as the basis points over LIBOR charged on the loan, and is computed by 
averaging over all loan facilities within a syndicated loan package.  #Covenants is the number of 
covenants associated with the package.  Finally, we use OLS (a probit model) to estimate 
Equation 1 when using Z-Score and EDF (ExtremeZ) as the dependent variable.  
 Table 3, panel A reports the results from the estimation of (1).  Columns 1 and 2 in Table 
3, panel A indicate that the riskiness of borrowers is increasing in the level of competition faced 
by the bank. Further, Column 3 indicates that the probability that a borrower is in financial 
distress at the time of loan origination is also increasing in BCE.23  Thus, Column 3 provides 
evidence that the results from Columns 1 and 2 are not entirely driven by the bank granting 
credit to borrowers that are closer to crossing over the distress threshold.  Rather, it provides 
evidence that a bank operating in more competitive environment increases it’s lending to 
borrowers that are already below the threshold.  Our results are both statistically and 
economically meaningful as the marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in BCE, 
holding the other variables at their mean values, is associated with nearly a 5% change in the 
probability that a borrower is already in distress at the time of loan origination. 
2.3.2 BCE and Pricing Borrower Risk 
Having shown that banks issue credit to riskier borrowers when faced with increased 
competition, we now examine the relationship between competition and a bank’s pricing of risk.  
In the face of competitive pressures, theory suggests that banks may reduce the sensitivity of 
interest spreads to borrower risk in order to maintain their lending volume (Broecker [1990]). To 
                                                          
23 Because our probit model includes substantial fixed effects in a panel set, the coefficients reported are potentially 
biased or inconsistent (e.g., Greene [2004]).  Accordingly, we also run this model using OLS and find that the signs 
and statistical significance of our variable of interest is robust to the use of a linear probability model. 
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examine this conjecture, we estimate the following OLS pooled regressions clustering the 
standard errors by both time and bank. 
 
Spreadt  0  1BCEt * BorrowerRiskt  2BCEt  3Tier1t  4LenderSizet 
5BorrowerRiskt  6BorrowerSizet  7 Revolovert  8 Amountt 
9 Maturityt  10 #Covenantst  BankEffects BorrowerEffects
TimeEffects  t ,
             (2) 
where Spread is measured as the basis points over LIBOR charged on the loan, averaged over all 
loans in a loan package.  We again use three measures of the borrower’s risk (BorrowerRisk); Z-
Score, EDF, and ExtremeZ.  All other variables are as defined earlier. 
 The results are included in Table 3, panel B. Consistent with higher borrower risk driving 
higher spreads, we find that the main effects (Z-Score, EDF, ExtremeZ) are all positive.  Our 
main variable of interest is the interaction of these borrower variables with the lender’s BCE. We 
find that each of these interactions is directionally consistent with our predictions and that two of 
the three measures (Z-Score and ExtremeZ) are statistically significant.  These findings combine 
with those of panel A to suggest that a lender’s competitive environment not only result in 
lending to riskier borrowers, but also that banks appear willing to receive less compensation per 
unit of risk when operating in increasingly competitive environments.  
2.3.3 BCE and Loan Restrictions 
 Finally, we examine the relationship between BCE and the number of covenants. Berlin 
and Mester [1992] suggest that a lender’s ability to monitor is increasing in the number of 
restrictions that it attaches to the loan.  However, an increased number of restrictions may reduce 
the attractiveness of the arrangement from the borrower’s perspective (Dell’ Ariccia [2000]).  
Therefore, banks facing intense competition in the lending market may relax restrictions on loans 
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in an effort to increase loan volume.  We test this conjecture by estimating the following OLS 
pooled regression: 
#Covenantst  0  1BCEt  2Tier1t  3LenderSizet  4BorrowerRiskt 
5BorrowerSizet  6Revolvert  7 Amountt  8 Maturityt 
9Spreadt  BankEffects BorrowerEffectsTimeEffects  t ,
                    (3) 
where #Covenants is measured as the total number of financial covenants in the contract at the 
time of origination.  All other variables in (3) are as defined previously. 
 Panel C of Table 3 reveals that the number of covenants attached to loans is decreasing in 
BCE. This finding is consistent with Skinner [2011] who conjectures that one potential reason 
that so few covenants are included in debt agreements is due to the “nature of competition in 
debt markets”.  To the extent that #Covenants captures how restrictive the loan terms are for the 
borrower, this result provides evidence that banks are willing to relax the restrictiveness of loans 
when facing increased competition.  Results in panel C combine with the evidence provided in 
Panels A and B of Table 3 to show that banks relax their underwriting standards when they face 
high levels of competition. While prior analytical literature has modeled this relationship (e.g., 
Dell’Ariccia [2000], Gorton and He [2008]), and surveys have alluded to it as well, we believe 
that this paper provides the first large sample empirical evidence that the lender’s level of 
competition has a significant effect on the characteristics of lending contracts. 
 
3.  BCE and Bank Decision-Making Channels 
The analyses in Section 2 suggest that BCE captures valuable information about a bank’s 
competitive environment. We argue that BCE reflects managers’ assessments of the current and 
evolving competitive pressure they face from rival banks and non-banks. While increased rivalry 
will generally exert downward pressure on profitability, a central tenet of theories about relations 
20 
 
between competition and risk is that banks respond to increased competitive pressure through 
their choices of borrowers, lending standards, screening and monitoring efforts, loan contract 
features (e.g., Wagner, 2010) and leverage (Freixas and Ma, 2014), among other channels. Such 
operating and investing decisions will be key contributing factors in determining both future 
profitability and bank risk. In this section, we explore three specific decision-making channels 
through which competition can work to influence bank stability. Specifically, we examine the 
associations between BCE and a bank’s future loan loss provisioning decisions, revenue mix 
decisions as reflected by its non-interest sources of revenue, and Tier 1 capital levels. 
3.1 BCE and Accounting Decisions 
Prior research shows that banks differ in their loan loss provisioning policies, with some 
banks more aggressively delaying expected losses to future periods (Beatty and Liao [2011], 
Bushman and Williams [2012, 2014]).  Such delays provide banks with the current benefit of 
higher profitability at the expense of lower expected future profitability. If competition puts 
downward pressure on a bank’s profits, a bank manager may seek to prop up the bank’s reported 
earnings by delaying the recognition of expected loan losses.  Accordingly, we conjecture that 
higher competition will lead bank managers to reduce the timeliness of recognizing their banks’ 
expected loan losses.  
 To test this conjecture, we estimate the following OLS model, clustering standard errors 
by both bank and time:  
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where LLP is defined as loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total loans.  ΔNPL is the change in 
non-performing loans over the quarter scaled by lagged total loans;  Ebllp is earnings before loan 
loss provisions and taxes scaled by lagged total loans;  Loan Growth is the percentage change in 
total loans over the quarter; Commercial, Consumer and RealEstate is the percentage of 
commercial, consumer and real estate loans (respectively) relative to the bank’s total loan 
portfolio; and Deposits, defined as total deposits scaled by lagged loans, is included to control 
for differences in bank funding. All other variables have been defined previously. 
   To capture timeliness of expected loan loss recognition, we focus on both the β11 and β12 
coefficients, where larger values of β11 and β12 are indicative of more timely loss recognition 
(i.e., current loan loss provisions are more sensitive to current and future changes in non-
performing loans). We then test the effect of competition on the timeliness of loss recognition by 
examining the β1 and β2 coefficients.  We conjecture that such pressures will result in β1 < 0 and 
β2 < 0 as banks choose to delay loss recognition until future periods.   
 Results from the estimation of (4) are reported in Table 4. Consistent with our 
conjectures, we find that banks’ accrual choices are a function of competition. Specifically, we 
find that both β1 and β2 and significantly different from zero (p < 0.01), consistent with decreased 
timeliness in the recognition of expected losses.  These findings suggest that bank managers use 
their accounting discretion to buoy up profits in highly competitive environments. This behavior 
can be consequential for a bank as prior research provides evidence consistent with delayed 
expected loss recognition having negative implications for credit supply (Beatty and Liao 
[2011]), bank risk shifting (Bushman and Williams [2012]), and both individual bank and 
systemic risk (Bushman and Williams [2014]). This suggests that competition can operate 
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through bank manager’s decision accounting decisions to generate externalities that extend 
beyond the individual bank’s reported profitability.  
3.2 BCE, Revenue Mix Decisions and Non-interest Income 
In this section, we examine whether banks respond to competitive pressure in the loan 
market by aggressively seeking out non-interest sources of revenue. Sources of non-interest 
revenue include investment banking, venture capital and trading activities. Prior research 
examining banks’ pursuit of these activities generally concludes that diversification into these 
activities increases bank risk. Specifically, Stiroh [2004, 2006] and Fraser et al. [2002] find that 
non-interest income is associated with more volatile bank returns. DeYoung and Roland [2001] 
find fee-based activities are associated with increased revenue and earnings variability. 
Brunnermeier et al. [2012] find that banks with higher non-interest income have a higher 
contribution to systemic risk than traditional banking. Examining international banks, Demurgic-
Kunt and Huizinga [2010] find that bank risk decreases up to the 25th percentile of non-interest 
income and then increases, and De Jonghe [2010] finds non-interest income to monotonically 
increase systemic tail risk.  
While these prior studies document that increased bank risk is associated with a bank’s 
pursuit of non-interest income, it is not clear why banks choose to pursue these revenue sources. 
Accordingly, we address this unanswered question by examining the extent to which competition 
drives banks to seek out these alternative sources of income. We consider two measures of non-
interest revenue: RevMix, defined as total non-interest revenue divided by interest revenue, and 
FeeMix, the total non-interest income minus deposit service charges and trading revenue divided 
by interest revenue. We regress both of these measures on BCE and other appropriate control 
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variables using the following OLS specification, clustering standard errors by both time and 
bank: 
RevMixVariablet1  0  1BCEt  2NonIntExpt  3Commercialt  4Consumert 
5RealEstatet  6Depositst  7 Mismatcht  8Tier1t  9Sizet 
10ROAt TimeEffects BankEffects  t1,
            (5) 
where the dependent variable is either total revenue mix (RevMix) or fee revenue mix (FeeMix). 
We include NonIntExp, defined as total non-interest expense divided by interest revenue, to 
control for the total overhead carried by the bank.  Deposits, defined as total deposits scaled by 
lagged loans, is included to control for differences in bank funding. Following Adrian and 
Brunnermeier [2011], we include the bank’s Mismatch ((Current liabilities – Cash)/Total 
liabilities) to control for the bank’s reliance on short-term funding sources. ROA represents the 
bank’s return on book value of assets. We also include both time and bank fixed effects. All 
other variables have been defined previously. 
 Note that an observed coefficient of  is consistent with competition leading banks 
to change their mix of revenue sources by seeking out non-interest revenue activities. As 
reported in Table 5,  the estimated coefficient on BCE for RevMix (FeeMix) is 0.0153, p-value < 
0.01 (0.013, p-value < 0.01), suggesting that banks faced with increased competition shift their 
revenue mix in an attempt to supplement declining net interest margins. Given the findings from 
prior research linking a bank’s pursuit of non-interest revenue with increased risk, this finding 
highlights another important channel through which competition influences bank stability.  
 
3.3 Risk Mitigation – Competition and Bank Capital 
Given our findings that banks relax lending standards, delay recognition of expected loan 
losses and shift revenue mix in response to higher competition, prior research would predict an 
1  0
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increase in a bank’s risk profile (e.g., Bushman and Williams, 2014; Brunnermeir et al., 2012). 
However, it is possible that banks counteract increases in risk through these channels by 
engaging in offsetting risk mitigation activities. One way to mitigate risk would be to increase 
capital buffers. Because banking theory generally assumes that leverage is exogenous it does not 
provide clear guidance on this question. Exceptions include Frexias and Ma [2014] who allow 
bank leverage and risks to be jointly determined by the optimization behavior of banks, and 
shows that banks may choose higher or lower leverage depending intricately on the parameters 
of the model (see also Allen et al. [2009]). Empirical studies provide conflicting results 
concerning the relation between competition and bank capital. For example, Beck et al. [2013] 
and Berger et al. [2009] find that bank capital is decreasing in competition while Schaeck and 
Cihák [2012] find the opposite result. 
Accordingly, we examine whether banks mitigate risk by increasing capital buffers to 
offset increased risk-taking driven by competitive pressues. To do so, we run the following OLS 
regression: 
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   (6) 
where Tier1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio, and all other variables are as previously defined.  
 Table 6 reports the results from estimating equation (6). Contrary to banks using capital 
buffers to offset the increased risk associated with higher competition, we find that BCE is 
negatively associated with Tier1. Specifically, we find a negative and significant coefficient on 
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Tier1 (-0.0032, p-value < 0.01). Thus, our results suggest that bank capital actually decreases 
with higher competition.24  
Of course bank capital is only one risk mitigation device and banks can potentially use a 
range of other mechanisms to increase or decrease risk levels in response to increased 
competition. To investigate the overall net effect of competition on bank risk, we next examine 
the relationship between BCE and direct measures of overall bank risk.  
4. Bank Competition and Risk 
In the prior sections, we document that competition affects both accounting and 
operational decision-making channels that have the potential to impact banks’ risk profiles. 
However, looking at each channel in isolation does not allow an overall assessment of the impact 
of competition on bank risk. In this section, we investigate the possibility that competition, 
operating through the channels considered earlier and other channels, increases the standalone 
risk of individual banks and systemic risk by increasing codependence in the tails of banks’ 
equity and asset returns. Section 4.1 investigates relations between competition and standalone 
risk of individual banks and section 4.2 examines competition and systemic risk. 
4.1 Competition and Standalone Risk of Individual Banks 
 We take two approaches to examining the standalone risk of a bank. First, we consider 
consequences of increased competition on the future performance of current lending activities.  
Second, we examine the association between competition and an individual bank’s downside risk 
as reflected in the probability distribution over a bank’s equity and asset values.  
                                                          
24 The question of how corporate governance impacts bank risk taking and capital levels is a significant, unresolved 
issue that is beyond the scope of our current paper. While the general literature on competition suggests that 
competition can serve a governance role, banks face distinctive governance challenges owing to tensions involved in 
balancing the demands of being value-maximizing entities with serving the public interest It is an open question as 
to whether good corporate governance disciplines risk-taking or encourages risk-shifting by banks. For further 
discussion of this issue see Mehran and Mollineaux [2012], Mehran et al., [2011], Fahlenbrach and Stulz [2011] and 
Anginer et al. [2014]. 
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4.1.1 Competition, Loan Growth and Future Charge-offs 
 In section 2.3, we provide evidence consistent with competition influencing banks to 
relax their underwriting standards. This finding raises questions about whether this behavior 
negatively impacts the future performance of banks’ loan portfolios. In this section we 
investigate the effect of competition on the relation between a bank’s current period loan growth 
and its future loan charge-offs. To the extent that banks’ lower underwriting standards in 
response to competition, we expect that an increase in current period loan growth will have a 
higher marginal association with future loan charge-offs as competition increases. To investigate 
this prediction, we estimate the following model, clustering the standard errors by both time and 
bank. 
LCO12m/24m  0  1LoanGrowtht  2BCEt  3LoanGrowtht * BCEt 
4LoanGrowtht *Consumert  5LoanGrowtht *Commercialt 
6LoanGrowtht * RealEstatet  7NPLt  8NPLt1  9NPLt2 
10Sizet  11Tier1t  12Consumert  13Commercialt 
14RealEstatet  15ROAt   t
                 (7) 
where LCO is total loan charge-offs divided by total loans at time t over either the next12 months 
(LCO12m) or 24 months (LCO24m). Loan growth is defined as the percentage change in total loans 
over the quarter. All other variables are as defined previously.  
 Table 7 reports the results of estimating (7). Consistent with our prediction, we find that 
β3 > 0 for each specification. Specifically, Table 7 reports that the portion of a bank’s current 
loans that are charged off both over the next 12 month (coef = 0.096, p-value<0.01) and 24 
month (coef = 0.0190, p-value<0.01) horizon are increasing in the bank’s competitive 
environment. This finding is particularly troublesome when considering our previous finding that 
competition reduces the timeliness of banks’ loan loss provisions and capital buffers.   
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4.1.3 Competition and Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
 In this section we examine the relationship between competition and characteristics of the 
probability distributions over changes in the market values of equity returns and total assets.25 
Because the market value of total assets is unobservable, we use a bank’s equity returns to 
transform the book values of assets into market values following the methodology in Adrian and 
Brunnermeier [2011] (see appendix B for details of this transformation).  
We capture a bank’s standalone tail risk using estimated value-at-risk (VaR). VaR 
measures the potential loss in value of a risky asset over a defined period for a given confidence 
interval. Let Xi represent bank i’s equity returns (or percentage change in asset values), and let q 
represent a given probability threshold. iqVaR  is then defined implicitly as 
( )i iqprobability X VaR q  .26 Following prior research (Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011]), 
Bushman and Williams [2014]), we use quantile regression to estimate time varying VaRs.  
 To compute time-varying VaR at the q-percentile, we estimate the following quantile 
regression over the bank’s full weekly time series, requiring a minimum of 260 observations: 
                                                        .                                                          (8a) 
M in (8b) is a vector of macro state variables.27  Our conditional weekly time-varying VaR at the 
q-percentile is computed as follows, where the coefficients are the estimates from equation (8a): 
 .                                                            (8b) 
                                                          
25 These two distributions are economically related as unhedged changes in the market value of a bank’s assets will 
have consequences for equity values. Any differences in the two distributions must derive from the underlying 
structure of a bank’s assets relative to its liabilities. 
26 If the VaR of a bank’s equity returns is -15% at a one-week, 95% confidence level, there is a only a 5% chance 
that banks equity value will drop more than 15% over any given week. 
27 See Appendix B for a detailed description of the vector of macro state variables used in this estimation. 
Xt
i   i   iMt1   ti
VaRq%,t
i  ˆ i  ˆ iMt1
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We compute a quarterly VaR by summing up the weekly VaRq%.   
We use three measures to reflect a bank’s risk profile. To capture tail risk, we use the 1% 
quantile VaR for equity (VaR1%
E ) and assets ( 1%
AVaR ), where more negative values indicate that 
the bank has a more severe downside loss threshold for a given probability 1% probability.  Our 
second measure is the distance between the VaR at the 1% quantile and the 50% quantile, which 
we term ΔVaRLeft. VaRLeftE  ( ALeftVaR ) captures the expected equity returns (percentage change 
in asset values) when a bank moves from the median to the 1% quantile.  Larger values of 
ΔVaRLeft indicate that the distribution has a longer left tail. Our third measure VaRRightE (
A
RightVaR ) is the distance from VaR50%E ( 50%AVaR ) to VaR99%E (VaR99%A ), where larger values of 
ΔVaRRight indicate that the bank’s distribution has a longer right tail. 
We estimate the effect of competition on the various measures of VaR using the 
following OLS regression model: 
VaRt
A/ E  0  1BCEt1  2Tradingt1  3Commercialt1  4Consumert1 
5Realestatet1  6 Mismatcht1  7 Depositst1  8ROAt1 
9Tier1t1  10Sizet1  11 E ,t1  12t1Mrkt  13Illiquidt1  14 MTBt1   t
       (9) 
where σE is standard deviation of the bank’s equity returns over the prior quarter. βMrkt is the 
bank’s equity beta from a basic CAPM model estimated by bank over the prior quarter. Illiquid 
is defined as the quarterly average of daily absolute value of stock returns divided by the dollar 
trading volume for the day. All other variables are as defined previously. 
 Table 8 panels A and B present the results from the estimation of equation (9) for both 
asset and equity VaR measures. The results in both panels A and B show that BCE is negatively 
correlated with both VaR1%
E (coefficient=-0.0604, p-value<0.01) and VaR1%
A (coefficient = -0.0737, 
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p-value<0.01). These results suggest that banks facing high competition also face more severe 
downside risk compared to banks facing weaker competitive pressures. Panels A and B in Table 
8 also suggests that competition primarily affects the left tail of the distribution. We find that 
BCE is significantly and positively associated with both EleftVaR  and AleftVaR , while it is not 
significantly associated with either ErightVaR  and ArightVaR . 
4.2. Competition and Systemic Risk 
 Finally, we investigate the effects of competition on systemic risk. There is no agreed 
upon approach to this measurement (e.g., Bisias et al., 2012, Hansen, 2014). One important 
stream of literature exploits the high frequency observability of bank’s equity prices to extract 
measures of systemic risk. Some papers in this stream use contingent claims analysis (e.g., Gray 
et al. 2008; Gray and Jobst, 2010), while others focus on codependence in the tails of equity 
returns using reduced form approaches (Acharya et al., 2010, Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011). 
Given that equity prices impound the market’s expectations about banks’ future prospects, 
equity-based measures of bank tail risk reflect risk assessments deriving from a wide range of 
underlying sources of vulnerability. We examine the relation between competition and systemic 
risk using two different measures of systemic risk that reflect co-dependence in the tails of equity 
(asset) returns to financial institutions, where co-dependence is used to distinguish the impact of 
the disturbances to the entire financial sector from firm-specific disturbances..  
4.2.1 ΔCoVaR 
We build directly on the earlier VaR framework and use the CoVaR construct from 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). CoVaR reflects the tail risk of the banking sector in aggregate, 
conditional on the performance of an individual bank i. The objective is to measure the extent to 
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which the tail risk of the banking sector is more severe when bank i is in distress relative to when 
bank i is operating at normal levels.   
Formally, CoVaR is the VaR of the banking system conditional on the state of an 
individual bank, and ΔCoVaR captures the marginal contribution of a specific bank to the tail 
risk of the banking sector. To compute we estimate the following quantile regressions 
equations again using weekly data: 
                                                               (10a) 
  ,                                         (10b) 
where Xi is bank i’s weekly equity return (percent asset change rate), Xsystem is the value-weighted 
equity return (asset change rate) from the index of all banks in the economy (excluding bank i), 
and M is the vector of macro state variable defined in Appendix B. Equation (10a) is just the VaR 
formulation we estimated earlier (i.e., equation (8a)).  Equation (10b) extends (10a) to a portfolio 
of banks and conditions on the performance bank i. (10a) is estimated at both q% = 1% and 50%, 
and (10b) at q% = 1%.  Using the predicted values from (9a) and (9b) we specify 
                                                       (10c) 
 ,                              (10d) 
, equation (10d), is the system’s time t VaR at q% = 1%, conditional on the VaR of the 
individual bank i being at either the 1% or 50% quantile.  To capture the sensitivity of the 
system’s conditional VaR1% to bank i’s events, we compute  
CoVaRq
Xt
i   i   iMt1   ti
Xt
system   1  2 Mt1  3 Xti   tsystem
%, 1
ˆˆi i iq t tVaR M   
CoVaR1%, t  ˆ 1  ˆ 2 Mt1  ˆ 3VaR1%or 50%, ti
CoVaR1%,t
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   .                          (10e) 
We sum weekly ΔCoVaR to obtain a quarterly measure, where more negative values of 
 indicates that a move by bank i from a median state of performance to a distressed 
state produces a larger marginal contribution to overall systemic risk.  
Using our estimates of ΔCoVaR we estimate the following equation.   
/
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    (11) 
where all variables were defined previously. To the extent that the effects of competition 
ultimately result in increases in systemic risk we expect to β1<0.  
 We estimate equation (11) and report the results in the first two columns in Table 9. The 
table shows that for ΔCoVaRE the coefficient on BCE is -0.0124 (p-value <0.01). For ΔCoVaRA 
the coefficient for BCE is -0.0156 (p-value <0.01). These results provide evidence that BCE is 
associated with an increase in an individual bank’s contribution to systemic risk.   
4.2.2 Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) 
 For our final measure of systemic risk we follow Acharya et al. (2010) and compute the 
marginal expected shortfall (MES) of the bank. MES captures the correlation between a bank’s 
equity returns and market equity returns on days where the market return is in the bottom 5% for 
the year. That is, it measures the extent to which an individual bank’s returns are low when the 
overall (banking) market returns are low. For each quarter end we compute the observed 
distribution of returns for the market as a whole over the subsequent 12 months. We then isolate 
CoVaRt  CoVaRtiVaR1% CoVaRtiVaR50%
 ˆ 1  ˆ 2 Mt1  ˆ 3 (VaR1%, ti VaR50%, ti )
CoVaRq
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the days that fall in the bottom 5% of market returns for the year, and compute the average return 
for each individual bank over those days. The more negative MES, the lower an individual 
bank’s returns are when the return of the banking sector is low (higher marginal expected 
shortfall).  We then estimate the following equation: 
 
MESt  0  1BCEt1  2Tradingt1  3Commercialt1  4Consumert1 
5Realestatet1  6 Mismatcht1  7 Depositst1  8ROAt1 
9Tier1t1  10Sizet1  11 E ,t1  12t1Mrkt  13Illiquidt1 
14 MTBt1   t
               (12)  
If competition increases the systemic risk of the bank we would predict β1<0. We estimate 
equation (12) and report the results in the last column in Table 9. The reported coefficient on 
BCE is -0.0025 (p-value < 0.05), which indicates that competition increases the marginal 
expected shortfall of the bank. To put economic significance on the results, a one standard 
deviation increase in BCE results in a 12% reduction in the average return over the days in the 
banking market’s bottom 5%.  
4.3 Deregulation and post-deregulation analyses 
In the previous analyses, we used a branch banking deregulation index to validate BCE as 
a timely measure of real competitive pressures (Section 2.2), and then used BCE to investigate 
the extent to which competition impacts the future decision-making and risk profile of banks. In 
this section, we extend the analysis by breaking our analyses into two parts. First, we perform a 
deregulation analysis that incorporates the deregulation index directly into our risk analyses. This 
analysis is intended to bolster our results on the linkages between competition and bank stability. 
Second, we perform a post-deregulation analysis that uses BCE to measure competition. This 
analysis has the objective of providing additional support for BCE as a useful measure of 
competition.  
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The main BCE results in the paper are based on analyses run over the entire 1996-2010 
sample period. The last deregulation event in our sample occurs in 2005. For the deregulation 
analysis, we truncate the sample at the end of 2005 and run risk analyses using the branch bank 
deregulation index to measure competition. We perform this analysis for VaR, CoVar, MES, 
revenue mix, loan loss provisioning policy, and future charge-offs.28 As reported in table 10, our 
results using the deregulation index are qualitatively similar to those using BCE. The one 
exception is our analysis of Revenue Mix where the coefficient on BCE is in the right direction 
but is not statistically significant. These findings provide support that our primary results using 
BCE as a proxy for competition document an actual linkage between bank competition and both 
future decisions and bank risk. 
On the other hand, the post-deregulation analyses only include observations for banks 
headquartered in a given state for time periods subsequent to the last deregulation event in that 
state. We then run our analyses using BCE as a proxy for competition using this restricted 
sample. As reported in table 11, we are able to replicate all of our main results in the post-
deregulation analyses. The fact that the post-deregulation analyses using BCE replicates the 
results from both our overall BCE and deregulation analyses suggests that BCE can be of value 
to researchers, investors, and analysts for measuring competitive pressure at any point in time, 
regardless of the existence of a regulatory event. 
4.4 Channel Attenuation Analysis 
 The previous analysis indicates that more competition leads to more systemic risk, while 
section 3 provides evidence that more competition also leads banks to make accounting and 
operating decisions that prior literature has found to increase systemic risk. If competition is 
                                                          
28 Data limitations preclude us from running deregulation analysis for the loan contracting variables as Dealscan is 
too thinly populated during the years when many of the deregulation events occurred. 
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working through these specific channels to influence systemic risk, then the inclusion of these 
channels in our model should reduce the affect that BCE has on systemic risk. Accordingly, we 
use an attenuation analysis approach (Baron and Kenny, 1986) to examine this conjecture.  
 To perform this analysis, we include variables in our model that proxy for: (1) the 
timeliness of each bank’s loan loss provisioning, and (2) each bank’s revenue mix. While Section 
2.3 indicates that competition reduces underwriting standards, another channel that influences 
systemic risk, data limitations preclude us from including the quality of a bank’s underwriting 
standards. Accordingly, we do not include this channel in our analysis. To capture the timeliness 
of loan provisions in a single proxy, we follow Beatty and Liao (2011) and use loan loss 
allowance divided by non-performing loans (TimelyLLP). We also use RevMix to capture each 
bank’s pursuit of non-interest revenue sources. 
 We first estimate equations (11) and (12) for the full sample of firms that have all of the 
variables required for the mitigation analysis. Similar to those results reported in Table 9, Panel 
A of Table 12 reports that BCE is negatively associated with both of the CoVaR variables and 
MES. We then re-estimate equations (11) and (12) and include TimelyLLP and RevMix. Panel B 
of Table 12 reports the results of estimating these modified equations. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find that the inclusion of TimelyLLP and RevMix in equations (11) and (12) 
reduces the magnitude of the BCE coefficient. Specifically, we find that the magnitude of the 
BCE coefficient is reduced by approximately 20% for both CoVaR variables and by 
approximately 40% for the MES regression. Further, our results provide additional support that 
banks’ loan loss provisioning and pursuit of non-interest income influence systemic risk in the 
manner indicated by prior research. Table 12 provides support to our conjecture that competition 
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influences systemic risk through both TimelyLLP (accounting channel) and RevMix (operations 
channel). 
4.5 Robustness Test: Controlling for the Lerner Index 
 We investigate whether our results using BCE are robust to the inclusion of the Lerner 
Index (LI).  To investigate BCE’s ability to explain behavior above and beyond the Lerner Index, 
we begin by computing the Lerner Index (LI) for each bank-year (see Appendix A for details), 
where higher values are an indication of monopoly like behavior.29. We then re-run the primary 
analyses including both BCE and LI and report the results in Table A4 of the Online Appendix. 
Table A4, panel A shows the results for the primary channels analyses. In all three cases, our 
results with BCE are robust to the inclusion of the Lerner index. However the results for LI are 
both weaker and less consistent than those identified with the BCE measure. In panels B and C 
we report results from the various risk analyses. Similar to panel A, we find that BCE is robust to 
the inclusion of the Lerner index. However in the case of two of the three systemic risk 
measures, the coefficients on LI indicate that more competition results in less systemic risk. 
Overall the results from Table A4 provide strong evidence that BCE provides information above 
and beyond that which is captured by other bank-time specific measures of competition.   
5.  Summary 
In this paper, we address three important open questions in the banking literature: How 
should bank competition be measured? What specific channels does bank competition operate 
through to increase or decrease risk? Does bank competition increase or decrease individual bank 
and banking system risk? We make several contributions to the existing literature. 
                                                          
29 In unreported results we also compute bank-quarter LI and results are robust.  
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First, building on Li et al. [2013], we use textual analysis of banks’ 10-K filings to 
construct a comprehensive, time-varying, bank-specific measure of a bank’s competitive 
environment (BCE). We significantly extend Li et al. [2013] and the textual-analysis literature 
more generally by exploiting several salient opportunities unique to banking to provide 
validation that BCE captures current and evolving changes in the competitive environment of 
specific banks in a more timely fashion than classical measures of competition. The enhanced 
timeliness of BCE makes it particularly conducive to examine future bank responses to current 
shifts in competition. Specifically, we use U.S. branch banking deregulation to generate a 
measure of exogenous changes in the threat of entry. We provide evidence that BCE is a timely 
measure of real competitive pressures by showing that it significantly increases following 
decreases in barriers to out-of-state branch entry, after controlling for other commonly used 
competition measures. We also show that changes in BCE are associated with reduced 
underwriting standards on future loans consistent with recurring surveys by bank regulators in 
which banks regularly report that changes in competition are the most prevalent reason for easing 
underwriting standards. 
Second, we extend the literature by investigating how competition influences three key 
decision-making channels that prior literature links to increased bank risk, finding that higher 
competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely accounting recognition 
of expected loan losses, and greater reliance on non-interest sources of income. Our results on 
the relation between competition and loan loss provisioning complements and extends Dou et al. 
[2013], who show that delayed loan loss recognition increases following reductions in out-of-
state branching restrictions. In contrast to their study, we use deregulation to validate our 
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measure, and then use this measure to capture competitive pressure at any point in time, 
independent of a regulatory event. 
Third, we show that risk at the individual bank level and a bank’s contribution to system-
wide risk is increasing in competition. We find that competition is associated with significantly 
higher risk of individual banks suffering severe drops in their equity and asset values. At the 
system level, we find that higher competition is associated with significantly higher co-
dependence between downside risk of individual banks and downside risk of the banking sector. 
Our within country, within bank analyses of competition and systemic risk complement a recent 
stream of papers examining this issue in a cross-country setting (e.g., Anginer et al. [2014], Beck 
et al. [2013], and Schaeck et al. [2009]). 
Finally, we show that our results using BCE are largely robust to replacing BCE with 
branch bank deregulation. We break our analyses into two parts, a deregulation and post-
deregulation analysis. For the deregulation analyses, we truncate the sample to end after the final 
deregulation event in the sample and run our analyses using the branch bank deregulation index 
to measure competition. The post-deregulation analyses measure competition with BCE and only 
include observations subsequent to the last deregulation event in a state. We find that our main 
results largely hold in both the deregulation and post-deregulation analyses. The results of this 
deregulation analyses represent contributions in their own right as we are the first paper to use 
bank deregulation to comprehensively investigate relations between changes in the threat of 
entry and future decisions and the risk profile of banks. Further, the results of our deregulation 
and post-deregulation analyses taken together provide support for our claim that our BCE results 
reflect an actual linkage between competition and future decisions and bank risk, and suggest 
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that BCE can be of value to researchers, investors, and analysts seeking to measure competitive 
pressure at any point in time, regardless of a regulatory event. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix briefly describes the Lerner Index and how we estimate these measures in the 
current paper. 
Lerner Index (see e.g., Beck et al. [2013] for further discussion): 
The Lerner index attempts to capture the extent to which banks can increase the marginal price 
beyond the marginal cost. The Lerner Index (LI) as follows: 
 
  ,                                                    (b) 
where Pit is defined as operating income (interest revenue plus non-interest revenue) to total 
assets.  
Using a translog cost function, we estimate the marginal cost of the bank (MC) as follows: 
 ,   (c) 
where Cit are the banks total costs (interest expense plus non-interest operating expenses) scaled 
by total assets. Q is the banks total output, which is defined as total assets. W1 is the input price 
of labor defined as wages divided by total assets; W2 is the input price of funds and is defined as 
interest expense to total deposits; W3 is the input price of fixed capital and is defined as non-
interest expenses divided by total assets.  
We estimate (c) using all banks with available data in the cross-section each year to attain 
predicted coefficients for each year. After estimating (c) we compute the marginal cost for each 
bank-year as: 
 .                                     (d) 
We then insert the resulting bank-year specific measure of MC from (d) into (b). This results in a 
bank-year specific Lerner Index measure.  
Lernerit  Pit  MCitPit
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Appendix B 
I. Estimating the market value of a bank’s total assets 
To compute each bank’s weekly percentage change in market-valued total assets (MVA) we 
follow prior research and define it as:.     
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MTB is the weekly market to book ratio, BVA (BVE) is the weekly book value of assets (equity), 
and MVE is market value of equity. Because book value of equity and book value of assets are 
only reported on a quarterly basis, we linearly interpolate the book value over the quarter on a 
weekly basis.  To compute the weekly percentage change in the banks market value of equity, we 
use CRSP and compute a weekly stock return for the bank. Note that equity returns can be 
recovered from (8a) by setting the ratio inside the square bracket equal to one.  
 
II. Macro state variable vector M used to estimate time varying VaRs 
 
The M vector we use follows Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011]. The vector consists of: 1) VIX, 
which captures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 reported by the CBOE; 2) Liquidity Spread, 
defined as the difference between the 3-month general collateral repo rate and the 3-month bill 
rate  Liquidity Spread is a proxy for short-term liquidity risk in market. We obtain the repo rates 
from Bloomberg and the bill rates from the Federal Bank of New York; 3) The change in the 3-
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month T-Bill rate (Δ3T-Bill), as it predicts the tails of the distribution better in the financial 
sector than the level; 4) ΔYield Curve Slope, measured as the yield spread between the 10-year 
Treasury rate and the 3-month rate;  5) ΔCredit Spread, defined as change in the spread between 
BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury rate with the same 10-year maturity; 6) The weekly value 
weighted equity market return (RetMrkt); and 7) the weekly real estate (SIC code 65-66) sector 
return in excess of the market return (RetEstate).  The 3-month T-Bill, 10-year Treasury, and 
spread between BAA-rated bonds and Treasuries are obtained from the Federal Reserve.  The 
market returns are from CRSP.   
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
BCE is the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 10-k (Li et al. [2013]).  
VaR is defined as the bank’s 1 percentile value-at-risk over the quarter. ΔCoVaR is our measure of systemic risk 
which is computed as the market’s value-at risk conditional on the bank’s value-at-risk. LLP is loan loss provision 
scaled by lagged total loans. ΔNPL is the change in nonperforming loans over the quarter scaled by lagged total 
loans.  EBLLP is earnings before tax and loan loss provision scaled by lagged total loans.  LCO is gross charge-offs 
scaled by lagged loans.  Loan Growth is the percentage change in total loans over the quarter. Commercial is the 
percentage of the loan portfolio in commercial loans.  Consumer is the percentage of consumer loans to total loans.  
RealEstate is the percentage of real estate loans to total loans. Mismatch is the maturity mismatch. Trading is 
computed as total trading assets divided by total assets. RevMix is the ratio of non-interest income to total interest 
income. Deposits is total deposits scaled by lagged total loans.  Tier1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio.  Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Borrower Z-Score is the Altman z-score (Altman [1977]) of the borrower.  
Borrower EDF is the expected default frequency (Bharath and Shumway [2008]). Borrower Size is the natural 
logarithm of the bank’s (firm’s) lagged total assets.  Spread is the basis points over Libor on the loan. #Covenants is 
the number of financial and net worth covenants associated with the package. Revolver is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the facility is a revolver and 0 otherwise. Amount is the natural log of the facility amount. Maturity is the 
number of months to maturity.   
 
Variables Mean Median StdDev 
BCE 0.3524 0.3071 0.2597 
VaRA -1.4701 -1.2699 0.8477 
ΔCoVaRA -0.2218 -0.1990 0.1595 
VaRE -1.4737 -1.2652 0.8696 
ΔCoVaRE -0.1969 -0.1752 0.1451 
MES -0.0122 -0.0092 0.0237 
LLP 0.0013 0.0007 0.0019 
ΔNPL 0.0006  0.0001 0.0042 
EBLLP 0.0071  0.0068 0.0038 
LCO 0.0019  0.0007 0.0031 
Loan Growth 0.0341  0.0207 0.1125 
Commercial 0.1209 0.1087 0.1157 
Consumer 0.0243  0.0000 0.0576 
RealEstate 0.4677  0.5949 0.3520 
Maturity Mismatch 0.8442 0.8703 0.1043 
Trading 0.0011 0.0000 0.0069 
RevenueMix 0.1451 0.1267 0.0947 
Deposits 1.2166 1.1608 0.3085 
Tier 1 0.1113 0.1061 0.0371 
Size 7.4284 7.0732 1.5633 
Borrower Z-Score  2.8391  2.4628 2.0701  
Borrower EDF  5.9444  0.0000  17.9323 
Borrower Size  7.2649  7.2618  1.6741 
Spread  152.4018  125.0000  102.5396 
#Covenants  2.5238  2.0000  1.1128 
Revolver  0.8476  1.0000  0.3594 
Amount  5.5502  5.6284  1.3282 
Maturity  47.5580  59.0000  21.2108 
LI 0.9419  0.9727  0.0665 
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Table 2 – Measures of Competition (BCE, LI, and HH) on Interstate Regulation Index 
The table below presents the results from an OLS regression of BCE on RegIndex. Where BCE is defined 
as the number of instances the word ‘competition’ appears in the bank’s 10-K divided by the total number 
of words in the 10-K (Li et al., 2013). RegIndex is the Rice and Strahan (2010) branching restrictiveness 
index, where higher values indicate more restrictions. The regression includes both bank and time fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by bank and year.  
 
 Panel A. 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable BCE BCE & Geographic 
Footprint 
LI 
RegIndex -0.0068** -0.0069** 0.0002 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] 
Unemployment 0.0031 0.0031 -0.0005* 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.000] 
Leading Index 0.0025 0.0025 0.0004 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 14,633 14,633 14,633 
 
Panel B. 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable 1st Stage: BCE 2nd Stage: BCEResdiual
RegIndex  -0.0062** 
  [0.002] 
Unemployment -0.0315***  
 [0.004]  
Leading Index 0.0148***  
 [0.004]  
LI -0.7352***   
 [0.130]   
HH 0.0258   
 [0.078]   
   
Year FE No Yes 
Firm FE No Yes  
N 14,633 14,633 
*, **, *** Indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 3 – Competition and Contracting 
The below results report pooled OLS regressions.  The dependent variable Z-Score is the Altman z-score 
(Altman [1977]) of the borrower.  EDF is the borrower’s expected default frequency (Bharath and 
Shumway [2008]).  ExtremeZ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower’s z-score is below 1.81 
and 0 otherwise. Lender BCE is the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total 
words in the 10-k (Li et al. [2013]).  Lender Tier 1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio at the end of the 
quarter.  Lender (Borrower) Size is the natural logarithm of the bank’s (firm’s) lagged total assets.  
Revolver is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the package includes a revolver and 0 otherwise. Amount is 
the natural log of the package amount.  Maturity is the number of months to maturity.  Spread is the basis 
points over Libor on the loan.  #Covenants is the number of financial and net worth covenants associated 
with the package. Time, Borrower and Lender fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered 
by time and lender. 
 
Panel A – Portfolio Risk 
    Dependent Variables 
Variable Prediction Z-Score EDF Extreme Z 
Lender BCEt-1  − (Z-Score) -0.4334** 5.7253** 1.17863** 
 + (EDF/ExtremeZ) [0.187] [2.859] [0.564] 
Lender Tier 1 (%)  0.0380 -1.4081*** -0.1590* 
  [0.034] [0.535] [0.083] 
Lender Size  -0.0451 1.4272 0.4841 
  [0.119] [1.327] [0.301] 
Borrower Size  -0.6891*** -0.7354 1.2158*** 
  [0.088] [1.090] [0.113] 
Revolver  -0.0950 3.4371*** 0.1828 
  [0.060] [1.098] [0.171] 
Amount  -0.0011 0.2433 0.0271 
  [0.047] [0.523] [0.108] 
Maturity  0.0034*** -0.1123*** -0.0071 
  [0.001] [0.021] [0.005] 
Spread  -0.0059*** 0.0730*** 0.0141*** 
  [0.000] [0.007] [0.001] 
#Covenants  -0.0561** -1.5090*** -0.0908* 
  [0.027] [0.400] [0.055] 
     
Estimation   OLS OLS Probit 
Fixed Effect  Bank, Borrower, 
Time 
Bank, Borrower, 
Time
Bank, Borrower, 
Time 
Observations  6,546 6,546 1,854 
R-squared  0.840 0.641   
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 3 – Competition and Contracting  
The below results report pooled OLS regressions.  The dependent variable Spread is the basis points over 
Libor on the loan.  Lender BCE is the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total 
words in the 10-k (Li et al. [2013]).  Lender Tier 1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio at the end of the 
quarter.  Lender (Borrower) Size is the natural logarithm of the bank’s (firm’s) lagged total assets. 
Borrower Z-Score is the Altman z-score (Altman [1977]) of the borrower.  Borrower EDF the expected 
default frequency (Bharath and Shumway [2008]). ExtremeZ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
borrower’s z-score is below 1.81 and 0 otherwise. Revolver is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
package includes a revolver and 0 otherwise.  Amount is the natural log of the package amount.  Maturity 
is the number of months to maturity.  #Covenants is the number of financial and net worth covenants 
associated with the package.  Time, Borrower and Lender fixed effects are included and standard errors 
are clustered by time and lender. 
 
Panel B – Under Pricing 
Variable Prediction Dependent Variable: Spread 
Lender BCEt-1* Z-Score + 15.0750***  14.6132***  
  [4.321]  [3.876]  
Lender BCEt-1* EDF −  -0.4430 -0.0870  
   [0.685] [0.651]  
Lender BCEt-1*ExtremeZ −     -50.7016*** 
      [18.613] 
Lender BCEt-1   -15.9468 28.0358** -20.8043 49.5375*** 
  [18.818] [13.736] [18.864] [13.696] 
Lender Tier 1 (%)  2.3144 3.2667 3.5663 2.6899 
  [2.393] [2.410] [2.253] [2.431] 
Lender Size  -1.8497 -2.3409 -3.1981 -0.9965 
  [6.214] [6.421] [5.941] [6.340] 
Borrower Z-Score − -19.2750***  -16.3988***  
  [1.317]  [1.244]  
Borrower EDF +  1.3223*** 1.0387***  
   [0.160] [0.154]  
Borrower ExtremeZ +     58.4934*** 
      [4.369] 
Borrower Size  -25.0786*** -12.9323*** -21.4505*** -21.3105*** 
  [3.902] [3.944] [3.958] [3.850] 
Revolver  -4.0803 -6.7814 -7.1977* -3.0726 
  [4.283] [4.535] [4.226] [4.580] 
Amount  -1.3097 -1.5674 -1.4820 -0.8031 
  [2.494] [2.356] [2.291] [2.579] 
Maturity  0.1736* 0.2574*** 0.2724*** 0.1353 
  [0.097] [0.097] [0.093] [0.104] 
#Covenants  11.0501*** 14.0856*** 11.9850*** 12.7146*** 
  [1.607] [1.585] [1.553] [1.617] 
      
Fixed Effect  Bank, Borrower, 
Time 
Bank, Borrower, 
Time
Bank, Borrower, 
Time 
Bank, Borrower, 
Time
Observations  6,546 6,546 6,546 6,546 
R-squared  0.825 0.812 0.825 0.805 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 3 – Competition and Contracting  
The below results report pooled OLS regressions.  The dependent variable #Covenants is the number of 
financial and net worth covenants associated with the package.  Lender BCE is the number of occurrences 
of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 10-k (Li et al. [2013]). Lender Tier 1 is the 
bank’s tier 1 capital ratio at the end of the quarter.  Lender (Borrower) Size is the natural logarithm of the 
bank’s (firm’s) lagged total assets. Borrower Z-Score is the Altman z-score (Altman [1977]) of the 
borrower. Borrower EDF the expected default frequency (Bharath and Shumway [2008]). Revolver is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the package includes a revolver and 0 otherwise. Amount is the natural log 
of the package amount.  Maturity is the number of months to maturity.  Spread is the basis points over 
Libor on the loan.  Time, Borrower and Lender fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered 
by time and lender. 
 
Panel C – Relaxed Activity Restrictions 
Variable Prediction Dependent Variable: #Covenants 
Lender BCEt-1  − -0.2747** -0.2420** -0.2526** 
  [0.114] [0.117] [0.113] 
Lender Tier 1 (%)  -0.0445** -0.0490** -0.0485** 
  [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] 
Lender Size  -0.0079 -0.0025 -0.0033 
  [0.045] [0.044] [0.044] 
Borrower Z-Score  -0.0139  -0.0209 
  [0.020]  [0.019] 
Borrower EDF   -0.0030** -0.0033** 
   [0.001] [0.001] 
Borrower Size  0.0511 0.0564 0.0419 
  [0.044] [0.045] [0.042] 
Revolver  0.0208 0.0328 0.0313 
  [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] 
Amount  -0.0129 -0.0119 -0.0120 
  [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Maturity  0.0019* 0.0015* 0.0016* 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Spread  0.0016*** 0.0020*** 0.0017*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
     
Fixed Effect  Bank, Borrower, 
Time 
Bank, Borrower, 
Time
Bank, Borrower, 
Time 
Observations  6,546 6,546 6,546 
R-squared  0.771 0.772 0.772 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 4 – Competition and Accrual Choices 
The below results report pooled OLS regressions.  The dependent variable LLP is defined as the loan loss provision 
scaled by lagged total loans.  BCE is the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words 
in the 10-k (Li et al. [2013]). ΔNPL is the change in nonperforming loans over the quarter scaled by lagged total 
loans.  EBLLP is earnings before tax and loan loss provision scaled by lagged total loans.  Loan Growth is the 
percentage change in total loans over the quarter.  Size is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets.  Tier 1 is the 
bank’s tier 1 capital ratio at the end of the quarter. Consumer is the percentage of consumer loans to total loans. 
Commercial is the percentage of the loan portfolio in commercial loans. RealEstate is the percentage of real estate 
loans to total loans.  Big5 is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the bank is audited by a big 5 auditor and 0 
otherwise. Both time and bank fixed effects are included and the standard errors are clustered by bank and time.   
 
Variable Predictions Dependent Variable: LLPt
BCEt-1*ΔNPLt+1 − -0.0552*** 
  [0.017] 
BCEt-1*ΔNPLt − -0.0972*** 
  [0.018] 
Consumer*ΔNPLt+1  0.1298 
  [0.110] 
Consumer*ΔNPLt  0.2492* 
  [0.140] 
Commercial*ΔNPLt+1  0.1043** 
  [0.042] 
Commercial*ΔNPLt  0.2581*** 
  [0.059] 
Real Estate*ΔNPLt+1  -0.0010 
  [0.016] 
Real Estate*ΔNPLt  -0.0239 
  [0.021] 
BCEt-1  0.0003*** 
  [0.000] 
ΔNPLt+1  0.0308*** 
  [0.008] 
ΔNPLt  0.0782*** 
  [0.012] 
ΔNPLt-1  0.0575*** 
  [0.008] 
ΔNPLt-2  0.0521*** 
  [0.008] 
EBLLP  -0.0072 
  [0.011] 
Loan Growth  -0.0001 
  [0.001] 
Size  0.0003*** 
  [0.000] 
Tier1  0.0017 
  [0.002] 
Consumer  0.0006 
  [0.001] 
Commercial  0.0004 
  [0.001] 
RealEstate  0.0001 
  [0.001] 
   
Fixed Effect  Time, Bank 
Observations  17,693 
R-squared  0.488 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 5 – BCE and Operating Decisions: Revenue Mix and Fee Mix 
The below results report pooled OLS regressions where the dependent variables are RevMix defined as 
non-interest revenue divided by interest revenue.  FeeMix is defined as the total non-interest income 
minus deposit service charges and trading revenue divided by interest revenue.  BCE is the number of 
occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 10-k (Li et al. [2013]).  NonInt Exp 
is non-interest expense divided by interest revenue.  Commercial is the percentage of the loan portfolio in 
commercial loans.  Consumer is the percentage of consumer loans to total loans.  RealEstate is the 
percentage of real estate loans to total loans. Deposits is the total deposits scaled by lagged total loans. 
Mismatch is the maturity mismatch. Tier1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio.  Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets.  ROA is defined as net income divided by total assets.  Time and bank fixed effects are 
included in the regression and standard errors are clustered by time and bank. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
Variable  Prediction RevMix FeeMix 
BCEt-1 + 0.0153*** 0.0130*** 
  [0.004] [0.004] 
NonInt Exp  0.4429*** 0.2998*** 
  [0.028] [0.029] 
Commercial  0.0229 0.0360 
  [0.016] [0.026] 
Consumer  0.0074 0.0536** 
  [0.024] [0.025] 
RealEstate  0.0434*** 0.0416*** 
  [0.008] [0.014] 
Deposits  -0.0084* -0.0242*** 
  [0.005] [0.007] 
Mismatch  -0.0457*** -0.0242 
  [0.013] [0.017] 
Tier1  -0.0421 -0.0951 
  [0.051] [0.068] 
Size  0.0069* 0.0139** 
  [0.004] [0.006] 
ROA  15.5009*** 12.6299*** 
  [1.284] [1.448] 
    
Fixed Effects  Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations  18,444 10,054 
R2  0.827 0.764 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 6 – Competition and Regulatory Capital 
The below results report pooled OLS regressions where the dependent is Tier1 defined as the bank’s tier 1 
capital ratio. BCE is the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 
10-k (Li et al. [2013]).  Trading is the percent of trading revenue divided by interest revenue.  
Commercial is the percentage of the loan portfolio in commercial loans.  Consumer is the percentage of 
consumer loans to total loans.  RealEstate is the percentage of real estate loans to total loans.  Mismatch is 
the maturity mismatch.  Deposits is the total deposits scaled by lagged total loans.  ROA is the bank’s 
return on assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. βmrkt is defined and the market beta of the bank 
over the prior period. MTB is the bank’s market to book ratio. Time and bank fixed effects are included in the 
regression and standard errors are clustered by time and bank. 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Tier1Variable Prediction 
BCEt-1 − -0.0032** 
  [0.001] 
Trading  0.0664** 
  [0.032] 
Commercial  -0.0126* 
  [0.007] 
Consumer  0.0439*** 
  [0.008] 
RealEstate  -0.0002 
  [0.002] 
Mismatch  0.0077** 
  [0.003] 
Deposits  0.0072*** 
  [0.002] 
ROA  0.7964*** 
  [0.243] 
Size  -0.0113*** 
  [0.002] 
βmrkt  0.0027*** 
  [0.001] 
MTB  -0.0003* 
  [0.000] 
   
Fixed Effect  Time, Bank 
Observations  15,199 
R-squared  0.701 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 7 – Competition and Individual Bank Risk – Future Charge-offs 
The below results report pooled OLS regressions.  The dependent variable LCO12m (LCO24m) is defined as 
gross charge-offs scaled by lagged total loans over the next 12 (24) months.  BCE is the number of 
occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 10-k (Li et al. [2013]).  ΔNPL is the 
change in nonperforming loans over the quarter scaled by lagged total loans.  Loan Growth is the 
percentage change in total loans over the quarter.  Size is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets.  Tier 
1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio at the end of the quarter.  Consumer is the percentage of consumer loans 
to total loans.  Commercial is the percentage of commercial loans to total loans.  Real Estate is the 
percentage of real estate loans to total loans.  Both time and bank fixed effects are included and the 
standard errors are clustered by bank and time.   
 
  Dependent Variables 
Variable Prediction LCO12m LCO24m 
BCEt-1*Loan Growth + 0.0109*** 0.0198** 
  [0.004] [0.008] 
BCEt-1*Consumer  -0.0026 -0.0011 
  [0.013] [0.032] 
BCEt-1*Commercial  0.0032 0.0189 
  [0.009] [0.018] 
BCEt-1*RealEstate  -0.0069 0.0087 
  [0.005] [0.015] 
BCEt-1  0.0018** 0.0029** 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
ΔNPLt  0.5187*** 0.7869*** 
  [0.062] [0.136] 
ΔNPLt-1  0.4538*** 0.5879*** 
  [0.056] [0.111] 
ΔNPLt-2  0.4289*** 0.4512*** 
  [0.062] [0.091] 
Loan Growth  -0.0093** -0.0284** 
  [0.004] [0.013] 
Size  0.0042*** 0.0113*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] 
Tier 1  -0.0010 -0.0524*** 
  [0.009] [0.012] 
Consumer  -0.0002 -0.0145 
  [0.004] [0.011] 
Commercial  0.0173*** 0.0230*** 
  [0.002] [0.005] 
RealEstate  0.0024 -0.0094*** 
  [0.002] [0.003] 
ROA  -0.1238** -0.0304 
  [0.051] [0.235] 
    
Fixed Effect  Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations  12,833 11,037 
R-squared  0.642 0.664 
       ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 8 – Competition and Individual Bank Risk – VaR and VaRE  
The below results report pooled OLS regressions where the dependent variables are VaRA (VaRE) and is 
defined as the bank’s 1 percentile value-at-risk of market value of assets (equity) over the quarter.  BCE is 
the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 10-k (Li et al. 
[2013]).  Trading is the percent of trading revenue divided by interest revenue.  Commercial is the 
percentage of the loan portfolio in commercial loans.  Consumer is the percentage of consumer loans to 
total loans.  RealEstate is the percentage of real estate loans to total loans.  Mismatch is the maturity 
mismatch.  Deposits is the total deposits scaled by lagged total loans.  ROA is the bank’s return on assets. 
Tier1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio.  Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. σE	 is	 the	 standard	
deviation	of	equity	returns. βmrkt is defined and the market beta of the bank over the prior period. Illiquid is the 
average daily illiquid of the stock over the quarter. MTB is the bank’s market to book ratio. Time and bank fixed 
effects are included in the regression and standard errors are clustered by time and bank. 
 
    Panel A. VaR 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable VaR1%
A
 VaRLeftA   VaR50%A   VaRRightA   
BCEt-1 -0.0737*** 0.0750*** 0.0013 0.0496 
 [0.021] [0.020] [0.002] [0.054] 
Trading 0.5162 -0.6433 -0.1270 6.4303 
 [1.991] [1.995] [0.130] [5.259] 
Commercial -0.1900* 0.1707 -0.0193 0.4267** 
 [0.106] [0.106] [0.012] [0.190] 
Consumer 0.7333** -0.6868** 0.0464 -0.8898 
 [0.321] [0.317] [0.032] [0.556] 
RealEstate -0.1385*** 0.1524*** 0.0139*** 0.0997 
 [0.038] [0.037] [0.003] [0.070] 
Mismatch -0.0261 0.0456 0.0194* -0.2226 
 [0.071] [0.070] [0.010] [0.155] 
Deposits 0.0344 -0.0402 -0.0058* 0.0460 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.003] [0.049] 
ROA 10.0582*** -10.3364*** -0.2781 -13.1805* 
 [3.566] [3.618] [0.194] [6.915] 
Tier1 -0.0140 0.0263 0.0123 0.3742 
 [0.236] [0.237] [0.017] [0.366] 
Size -0.0291 0.0132 -0.0159*** -0.0067 
 [0.036] [0.036] [0.003] [0.084] 
σE -1.1551*** 1.1457*** -0.0094 1.6991** 
 [0.429] [0.422] [0.008] [0.662] 
βmrkt -0.0205 0.0189 -0.0016 0.0211 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.002] [0.046] 
Illiquid -9.9154 40.3437 30.4284** -51.3978 
 [290.799] [285.356] [13.707] [459.126] 
MTB 0.0096 -0.0062 0.0034*** -0.0521*** 
 [0.010] [0.009] [0.001] [0.017] 
     
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations 13,730 13,730 13,730 13,730 
R2 0.667 0.666 0.318 0.791 
    ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 8 – Competition and Individual Bank Risk –VaR and VaRE (Continued) 
The below results report pooled OLS regressions where the dependent variables are VaR (VaRE) and is 
defined as the bank’s 1 percentile value-at-risk of market value of assets (equity) over the quarter.  BCE is 
the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 10-k (Li et al. 
[2013]).  Trading is the percent of trading revenue divided by interest revenue.  Commercial is the 
percentage of the loan portfolio in commercial loans.  Consumer is the percentage of consumer loans to 
total loans.  RealEstate is the percentage of real estate loans to total loans.  Mismatch is the maturity 
mismatch.  Deposits is the total deposits scaled by lagged total loans.  ROA is the bank’s return on assets. 
Tier1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio.  Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.  σE	 is	 the	 standard	
deviation	of	equity	returns. βmrkt is defined and the market beta of the bank over the prior period. Illiquid is the 
average daily illiquid of the stock over the quarter. MTB is the bank’s market to book ratio. Time and bank fixed 
effects are included in the regression and standard errors are clustered by time and bank. 
 
    Panel B. VaRE 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable VaR1%
E
 VaRleftE  VaR50%E   VaRRightE   
BCEt-1 -0.0604*** 0.0580*** -0.0024 0.0590 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.002] [0.052] 
Trading 0.5262 -0.6244 -0.0981 6.8116 
 [2.124] [2.136] [0.112] [5.204] 
Commercial -0.0846 0.0666 -0.0180* 0.4471** 
 [0.102] [0.100] [0.010] [0.193] 
Consumer 0.7515** -0.6955** 0.0560* -0.8594 
 [0.319] [0.315] [0.032] [0.543] 
RealEstate -0.1693*** 0.1747*** 0.0054 0.0837 
 [0.039] [0.037] [0.004] [0.069] 
Mismatch -0.0069 0.0248 0.0178** -0.2176 
 [0.072] [0.070] [0.008] [0.150] 
Deposits 0.0326 -0.0341 -0.0015 0.0325 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.002] [0.051] 
ROA 10.1769*** -9.8016*** 0.3752* -11.7684* 
 [3.395] [3.237] [0.209] [6.511] 
Tier1 0.0377 -0.0595 -0.0219 0.4304 
 [0.240] [0.242] [0.013] [0.359] 
Size -0.0360 0.0235 -0.0125*** 0.0213 
 [0.038] [0.038] [0.003] [0.081] 
σE -1.1881*** 1.1668*** -0.0214** 1.6382** 
 [0.431] [0.422] [0.009] [0.638] 
βmrkt -0.0209 0.0188 -0.0021 0.0206 
 [0.029] [0.028] [0.002] [0.044] 
Illiquid 72.3665 -47.7744 24.5921** 83.1694 
 [321.465] [315.304] [9.482] [473.623] 
MTB 0.0101 -0.0070 0.0031** -0.0478*** 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.001] [0.017] 
     
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations 13,730 13,730 13,730 13,730 
R2 0.667 0.665 0.334 0.796 
    ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 9 – Competition and Systemic Risk – ΔCoVaR, ΔCoVaRE, and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) 
The below results report pooled OLS regressions where the dependent variables are: CoVaR A (CoVaRE )  
is the bank’s contribution to the system’s 1 percent VaRA(VaRE). MES and is defined as the bank’s average 
daily return computed over the trading days where the market return was in the bottom 5% over the 
quarter.  BCE is the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 10-k 
(Li et al. [2013]).  Trading is the percent of trading revenue divided by interest revenue.  Commercial is 
the percentage of the loan portfolio in commercial loans.  Consumer is the percentage of consumer loans 
to total loans.  RealEstate is the percentage of real estate loans to total loans.  Mismatch is the maturity 
mismatch.  Deposits is the total deposits scaled by lagged total loans. ROA is the bank’s return on assets. 
Tier1 is the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio.  Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.  σE	 is	 the	 standard	
deviation	of	equity	returns. βmrkt is defined and the market beta of the bank over the prior period. Illiquid is the 
average daily illiquid of the stock over the quarter. MTB is the bank’s market to book ratio. Time and bank fixed 
effects are included in the regression and standard errors are clustered by time and bank. 
      
 Dependent Variable 
Variable ΔCoVaRA ΔCoVaRE MES 
BCEt-1 -0.0156*** -0.0124*** -0.0025** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.001] 
Trading 0.4568 0.3578 -0.0475 
 [0.276] [0.224] [0.064] 
Commercial 0.0051 -0.0006 -0.0086 
 [0.014] [0.012] [0.007] 
Consumer 0.1118** 0.0799 0.0012 
 [0.052] [0.054] [0.012] 
RealEstate -0.0289*** -0.0215*** -0.0022 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] 
Mismatch 0.0173 0.0208* -0.0015 
 [0.013] [0.011] [0.003] 
Deposits 0.0039 0.0039 0.0030*** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.001] 
ROA 0.2471 0.2508 0.3102*** 
 [0.279] [0.266] [0.101] 
Tier1 -0.0810* -0.0728** -0.0346** 
 [0.042] [0.032] [0.014] 
Size -0.0060 -0.0046 -0.0039** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] 
σE -0.1021*** -0.0948*** -0.0137 
 [0.037] [0.036] [0.008] 
βmrkt 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0080*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] 
Illiquid 22.8645 60.2791 10.0473 
 [37.562] [43.901] [11.830] 
MTB 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0006 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
    
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank 
N 13,730 13,730 14,282 
R2 0.848 0.857 0.359 
     ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 10 – Deregulation, Channels and Risk 
The below results present pooled OLS regressions of the paper’s primary analyses controlling using the regulation 
index (RegIndex). All of the same controls from the original analyses are included but not reported. Time and bank 
fixed effects are included in the regression and standard errors are clustered by time and bank. 
 
Panel A. Channels – Accounting & Revenue Mix 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable LLP RevMix 
RegIndext -0.0001** -0.0005 
 [0.000] [0.001] 
RegIndext *ΔNPLt+1 0.0034*  
 [0.002]  
RegIndext *ΔNPLt 0.0067**  
 [0.003]  
   
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations 15,905 15,117 
R2 0.84 0.48 
 
Panel B. Individual Risk (Charge-offs, VaRA & VaRE) and Systemic Risk (ΔCoVaRA, ΔCoVaRE, & MES) 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable LCO24M  VaR1%
A  VaR1%
E  CoVaR A  CoVaR E  MES 
RegIndext -0.0007*** 0.0292*** 0.032*** 0.0038** 0.0039*** 0.0007** 
 [0.000] [0.009] [0.009] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
RegIndext*LoanGrowth -0.0075**      
 [0.003]      
       
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations 10,280 11,999 11,999 11,827 11,827 11,998 
R2 0.66 0.80 0.61 0.85 0.85 0.24 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
Table 11 – Channels and Risk in the Post-Deregulation Period 
The below results present pooled OLS regressions of the paper’s primary analyses during the post deregulation 
period. All of the same controls from the original analyses are included but not reported. Time and bank fixed 
effects are included in the regression and standard errors are clustered by time and bank. 
 
Panel A. Channels – Accounting & Revenue Mix 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable LLP RevMix 
BCEt-1 0.0003*** 0.0143*** 
 [0.000] [0.004] 
BCEt-1 *ΔNPLt+1 -0.0509***  
 [0.017]  
BCEt-1 *ΔNPLt -0.0902***  
 [0.018]  
   
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations 17,803 16,806 
R2 0.81 0.49 
 
Panel B. Individual Risk (Charge-offs, VaRA & VaRE) and Systemic Risk (ΔCoVaRA, ΔCoVaRE, & MES) 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable LCO24M  VaR1%
A  VaR1%
E  CoVaR A  CoVaR E  MES 
BCEt-1 0.0034** -0.0777*** -0.0672*** -0.0158*** -0.0122*** -0.0025** 
 [0.001] [0.020] [0.019] [0.004] [0.003] [0.001] 
BCEt-1*LoanGrowth 0.0191**      
 [0.008]      
       
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations 10,355 13,271 13,271 12,929 12,929 13,819 
R2 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.85 0.85 0.36 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
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Table 12 – Systemic Risk and Channels Mitigation 
The below results report pooled OLS regressions where the dependent variables are: CoVaR A (CoVaRE )  
is the bank’s contribution to the system’s 1 percent VaRA(VaRE). MES and is defined as the bank’s average 
daily return computed over the trading days where the market return was in the bottom 5% over the 
quarter.  BCE is the number of occurrences of competition-related words per 1,000 total words in the 10-k 
(Li et al. [2013]). Timely LLP is defined as the bank’s loan loss allowance dividend by NPL. RevMix 
defined as non-interest revenue divided by interest revenue. Control Variables include: Trading is the 
percent of trading revenue divided by interest revenue.  Commercial is the percentage of the loan 
portfolio in commercial loans.  Consumer is the percentage of consumer loans to total loans.  RealEstate 
is the percentage of real estate loans to total loans.  Mismatch is the maturity mismatch.  Deposits is the 
total deposits scaled by lagged total loans. ROA is the bank’s return on assets. Tier1 is the bank’s tier 1 
capital ratio.  Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.  σE	is	the	standard	deviation	of	equity	returns. βmrkt 
is defined and the market beta of the bank over the prior period. Illiquid is the average daily illiquid of the stock over 
the quarter. MTB is the bank’s market to book ratio. Time and bank fixed effects are included in the regression 
and standard errors are clustered by time and bank. 
 
 Dependent Variables 
Variable CoVaR A CoVaR E MES 
Panel A. Not Controlling for Channels   
BCEt-1 -0.0173*** -0.0138*** -0.0027** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations 12,383 12,383 12,383 
R2 0.848 0.857 0.367 
    
    
Panel B. Controlling for Channels   
BCEt-1 -0.0139*** -0.0111*** -0.0017** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] 
Accounting Channel:   
   Timely LLP 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0002*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Operations Channel:   
   RevMix -0.0313** -0.0313** -0.0011 
 [0.001] [0.015] [0.001] 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects Time, Bank Time, Bank Time, Bank 
Observations 12,383 12,383 12,383 
R2 0.866 0.857 0.381 
     ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 010 level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
